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INTRODUCTION 
The Soviet Union has comparatively little to offer the Third World by 
way of trade, investment and technology transfer. Consequently it has 
elected to base its Third World policy on the only field where it can match, 
or even surpass, the West: arms transfers. Hence arms supplies constitute 
the major foreign policy instrument employed by the Soviet Union in 
pursuit of its goals in the Third World in general, and the Middle East in 
particular. Although some have questioned the efficacy of arms transfers 
as an instrument of policy,1 most Western analyses consider Soviet military 
assistance rendered to the Third World to be very effective in absolute 
terms in building Soviet influence there. Joshua and Gilbert, for example, 
have concluded that "as more countries become recipients of Soviet mil-
itary aid programs, there will be a tendency for these countries to become 
greater political allies of the Soviet Union in world politics.'*2 
The issue of the degree of influence that the Soviet Union gains 
through its arms transfers policy in the Middle East is the topic of the 
present article. The main question put forward is as follows: To what 
extent, and under what circumstances, do Soviet arms transfers constitute 
an effective foreign policy instrument, taking into account their predomi-
nance among the various foreign policy instruments (such as economic 
aid) employed by the Soviet Union in its dealings with Middle East 
countries? Alternatively, in more concrete terms: Does the Soviet Union 
use military assistance as an instrument of political pressure over its 
Middle Eastern clients, and if so, how, and how successfully? 
In order to shed some light on these questions, attention is focused on 
three incidents in which the Soviet Union tried to influence its Arab clients 
through its arms supply policy. These three case studies are: 1) Soviet-
Egyptian procurement relations prior to the October 1973 War; 2) Syrian-
Soviet military relations following Syria's direct military intervention in 
Lebanon in June 1976; and 3) Soviet-Iraqi relations following the Iraqi 
invasion of Iran in September 1980. In each of the three studies, the Soviet 
Union perceived its client's behavior as contradicting — if not actually 
endangering — its national goals; consequently it tried to alter this policy 
to a more desirable course from the Soviet point of view. In each case, 
Soviet efforts at exerting influence varied in their timing, intensity and 
scope, depending on specific conditions and circumstances. Nevertheless, 
a comparative overview of these incidents may reveal common characteris-
tics which fit into a broader, general behavioralpattern adopted by the 
Soviet Union in its dealings with its Arab clients. 
THE CONCEPT OF INFLUENCE 
There is little doubt that power and influence are core concepts in the 
study of politics. Indeed, not a few researchers consider the quest for power 
to be the essence of political behavior, both in the internal and external 
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spheres. In Hans Morgenthau's words, "International politics, like all 
politics, is a struggle for power."3 However, despite the enormous efforts 
devoted to the understanding of various power/influence relationships, 
these two concepts clearly remain among the most complex, ambiguous 
and untenable in political science and international relations. 
For the purposes of this article, the influence of country A over the 
policy of country B is its ability to get country B (without the use of 
physical force) either to adopt, or, at least, proceed to a foreign policy 
course desired by A, or to refrain from taking a course of action that 
contradicts A's interests and/ or preferences. 
As defined here, influence is conceived to be a two-dimensional 
phenomenon, that is, both a process and a product. On the one hand, 
influence certainly is the net result; it is the outcome of A's attempts to 
influence B. Unless there is a clear observation of a successful (or even 
unsuccessful) attempt at influence, one might fail to detect the very exist-
ence of an influence relationship. On the other hand, any discussion of 
influence not grounded in a thorough examination of the influence process 
itself will inevitably be deficient to a considerable extent, and might in 
some instances lead even the most skilled observer to the wrong conclu-
sions regarding the essence of the influence relationship. 
One quickly discovers, however, that tracing the influence process is a 
very complicated task, mainly because of the indirect, intangible and 
elusive nature of political influence. This is particularly true in the study of 
influence relationships in international relations. While internal sover-
eignty legitimizes the employment of power and influence by state authori-
ties over their political community, external sovereignty definitely prohib-
its any interference by one state in the internal affairs of other states or in 
their right to shape foreign policy independently. Consequently, although 
most states engage to one degree or another in influencing others, they 
usually tend to camouflage these attempts at influence and to deny their 
very existence as, ostensibly, this would conflict with the fundamental 
principles of sovereignty and formal equality among nations upon which 
the present international system is based. The Soviet Union is no exception 
to this rule. It categorically denies that its military aid policies are moti-
vated by political influence considerations, attributing such motives only 
to "imperialists."4 
This state of affairs imposes certain methodological constraints upon 
the researcher who seeks to indentify and evaluate influence relationships. 
For example, an observation of B altering its behavior in conformity with 
A's interests does not necessarily indicate the existence of a successful 
attempt at influence, for it is quite possible that some intervening variables 
(say, country C or D) have prompted B to alter its policy. Moreover, this 
might not even indicate that A, in spite if its wish to see B altering its policy, 
actually exerted influence upon B. In order to overcome these methodolog-
ical obstacles, the discussion will be conducted within a specific format. 
First, a determination of whether and to what degree the Soviet Union was 
indeed interested in influencing its Arab client will be attempted. Secondly, 
the influence process itself, that is, the various means and techniques 
employed by the arms donor in its efforts to influence its clients, will be 
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examined. Finally, the article will seek to assess the results of the influence 
attempt, and to ascertain whether its success or failure was connected with 
the act of influence itself, or whether it may be attributed to unrelated 
factors. 
It should be noted that this article does not aim at creating a general 
analytical framework to encompass the totality of influence as a political 
and social phenomenon. Rather, it seeks to shed some light on a specific 
kind of influence relationship, limited in scope, domain and timing. 
The examination here will be confined to an asymmetric influence 
relationship, one between a superpower and a small/ medium Third World 
country. With regard to domain, it limits itself to the realm of foreign 
policy actions, and avoids any discussion of influence on the domestic 
political system. And finally, as mentioned above, this treatment also 
confines itself to a specific kind of relationship between countries, one of a 
"conflictual" context. Of course, situations involving conflict are not the 
only ones concerning influence relationships. Attempts at influence might, 
indeed do, occur in consensual situations, although the concept of influ-
ence does connote a difference of opinion, for if there does not exist such a 
difference, what is the point of influence? In any event, it is accepted for the 
purposes of this article that the more acute cases, those involving serious 
differences of opinion, might best illustrate the limits of an influence 
relationship. As Alvin Rubinstein put it, "Like breathing, influence 
becomes especially noticeable when pressure is applied or concern 
heightens."5 
ARMS AND INFLUENCE 
As noted, arms supplies are generally regarded as an effective instru-
ment of influence. It is a common assumption that the larger the arms deal 
and the longer the period of its implementation, the heavier will be the 
recipient's economic and military dependence upon the donor, and the 
lesser its ability to resist the latter's attempts at influence. Turning to the 
Soviet instance, some analysts believe that, from the economic standpoint, 
the relatively low price of Soviet arms and the convenient terms of pay-
ment (especially the possibility of repayment in commodities) effect a 
major shift in the recipient's trade toward the communist countries. This 
leads to a loss of markets in the West and leaves the arms recipient 
dependent upon the Soviet Union for its export earnings.6 
From the military point of view, not only do recipients import Soviet 
arms, they often import Soviet training patterns and combat doctrines, 
rendering military hardware from non-Soviet sources increasingly irrele-
vant to their operative needs. Moreover, due to the relatively low level of 
technical and scientific competence of most Third World military person-
nel, Soviet and Soviet bloc experts are usually required to assemble and 
maintain the newly arrived weapons in the recipient countries and to 
instruct local military personnel and technicians in their use.7 The Soviets, 
who are surely aware of the potential benefits inherent in their military 
assistance programs, do their best to implement these programs in a 
manner designed to create maximum long term dependence upon the 
USSR. Hence the Soviet tendency to supply weapons systems and military 
assistance within the framework of broad-scope arms deals which gener-
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ally include items for all branches of the armed forces, and to prefer local 
advisory/technical assistance over training in the Soviet Union.8 
The arms donor has at his disposal several techniques for converting 
his client's dependence into the hard facts of influence. These range from 
the more delicate means, such as persuasion and the offer of rewards via 
threat insinuation, to explicit manipulation of the arms flow to produce 
policy changes by the recipient. This article focuses upon the ultimate 
means of applying pressure through arms supplies, namely, withholding of 
arms from the recipient, as an instrument of influence, as this offers 
perhaps the best illustration of the power of both donor and recipient 
within the relationship. 
CASE STUDIES 
Soviet-Egyptian Military Relations 
Prior to the October 1973 War 
Egyptian-Soviet military relations reached their peak in the early 
1970s. At that time, Egypt was the Soviet Union's major Third World arms 
client. Egyptian weapons procurement was estimated at about 25 percent 
of all arms and military equipment supplied by the Soviet Union to the 
Third World as a whole. The USSR, for its part, managed to turn Egypt 
into its main naval foothold in the Mediterranean. Since the late 1960s, the 
Soviet Union possessed independent naval and aerial facilities in Eygpt, 
affording its Mediterranean Squadron repair, replenishment and mainte-
nance for its vessels and bases for conducting maritime patrol missions 
vis-à-vis the Sixth Fleet. 
This apparently idyllic relationship was suddenly disrupted in July 
1972, as the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, ordered the departure of 
most of the Soviet military and advisory personnel from Egypt. Even 
though Sadat later attributed this extreme move to his deep frustration 
with the Soviet attempts to prevent Egypt from going to war, his version is 
not taken at face value. Indeed, Kremlinologists differ as to the role played 
by the Soviet Union in the preparation of the October 1973 War. Some 
contend that the Soviets looked favorably upon the possibility of another, 
preferably limited, armed confrontation in the Middle East. Others go a 
step further and argue that the Soviet Union and the Arab states plotted 
together to launch the war.9 
According to these analysts, the Soviets' behavior was a direct result 
of their belief that "a war in the Middle East. . . if cautiously managed, 
could cause great damage to the West, without affecting detente."10 Oper-
ating under the assumption that its Arab clients could avoid suffering a 
new major defeat, the Soviet Union nonetheless believed that, in any case, 
such a defeat "would in all probability trigger off a process of radicaliza-
tion in the Arab world from which the Soviet Union could only gain."" 
An opposing school of thought maintains that, while the Soviets were 
most probably aware that Egypt and Syria were preparing for hostilities at 
an unknown (but probably early) date in the future, they did not take the 
initiative in pressing the Arabs to initiate hostilities,12 but were, on the 
contrary, rather dissatisfied with the possibility of a new round of war in 
the Middle East. Indeed, some even argue that the Soviets tried to dissuade 
their Arab clients from going to war.13 
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According to this line of thinking, the Soviets had very good reasons, 
at both regional and global levels, to strive for the preservation of the 
status quo in the Middle East in the early seventies. On the global level, a 
war in the Middle East at that time might have hampered the course of 
détente to which the Soviets were then committed. In particular, it could 
have affected the Soviets' major goals in Western Europe: "Western recog-
nition of the territorial status quo and Soviet hegemony over Eastern 
Europe; the permanent division of Germany and acceptance of the East 
German state; and a disunited, inadequately armed NATO, torn by jeal-
ousies, acrimony and lack of vision."14 As for the regional level, the Soviet 
leadership appeared to be sceptical of the Arab's ability to conduct a 
full-scale war successfully, fearing that such an effort might end in another 
Arab defeat, with severe implications for Soviet interests in the Middle 
East. Such a setback could jeopardize the prestige of Soviet weaponry, 
invoke Arab pressure for direct Soviet involvement in the crisis on behalf 
of its clients, and cause the Arabs to conclude that the road to the return of 
their lost territories passed through Washington, as the U.S. was the only 
power able to enforce concessions upon Israel. Indeed, this last apprehen-
sion proved correct when the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, decided 
after the October War to move into the Western sphere of influence. 
The author tends to accept this view. Not only did the Soviets have 
solid reasons to oppose another war in the Middle East, but there is a 
considerable body of evidence, relevant to this discussion. This evidence 
attests to the fact that from 1971 to the end of 1972 and, to a lesser degree, 
even in 1973, the Soviets employed their arms supply relationship with 
Egypt as a political lever to prevent Egypt from going to war. It is true that, 
during the years 1970-1973, the Soviet Union provided large quantities of 
arms and military equipment to all branches of the Egyptian armed forces, 
thereby facilitating significant force and weaponry enhancement and, 
eventually, enabling the launching of the October War. " However, accord-
ing to Egyptian sources — primarily the memoirs of Anwar Sadat but also 
memoirs and writings of Egyptian decision-making personalities not known 
for their anti-Soviet inclinations such as Muhammad Hasanein Heikai and 
then Chief-of-Staff General Saad al-Shazly — and in light of the actual 
weapons supply pattern during that period, it emerges that the Soviet 
Union indeed imposed several significant restrictions upon pre-war supply 
of arms and military equipment to Egypt: 
1. The Soviet Union did not supply Egypt with all of the weapons 
systems which the latter requested and believed essential for going 
to war. The most prominent example is the Soviet refusal to 
provide Egypt with MIG-23 combat aircraft and Tu-22 bombers 
which it had demanded consistently since 1971, despite the fact 
that two previous Soviet-Egyptian arms deals explicitly stipulated 
the supply of MIG-23s. 
2. The Soviet Union forbade countries enfranchised to manufac-
ture its weapons to supply such arms to Egypt. In 1971, for 
example, it barred India from responding to Sadat's request for 
certain military items. 
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3. Most of the advanced systems which the Soviet Union ulti-
mately supplied to Egypt prior to the war (such as T-62 tanks, 
BMP-1 APCs, SA-6 missiles and SCUD-B surface-to-surface 
missiles) were not dispatched until after Sadat's sudden expulsion 
of Soviet advisors from Egypt, a step which was largely intended 
to express Egyptian dissatisfaction with Soviet arms supply 
policies. 
4. Even the supply of less advanced military items, which arrived 
after the reduction of Soviet pressure and fostered no Egyptian-
Soviet disputes, was by no means a smooth process. A number of 
obstacles and delays often forced Egypt to change its operational 
timetables. For example, the Egyptians claimed that the October 
1971 arms deal was implemented at a pace which did not allow for 
absorption of weapons at the target dates determined by Sadat. 
Furthermore, they stated that several of the items included therein 
did not reach Egypt until after the expulsion of the Soviet 
advisors. 
5. The Soviets attempted to place limitations on Egyptian use of 
arms supplies. During Sadat's visit to Moscow (March 1971), for 
example, they agreed to supply Egypt with "planes equipped with 
missiles," yet demanded the exclusive right to determine their use. 
Following strenuous objections by Sadat, who claimed that this 
stipulation violated Egyptian sovereignty, the Soviets ultimately 
withdrew their demand.16 
These Soviet attempts at influence through arms supply proved to be 
highly unsuccessful. By the end of 1972, having realized that they were 
unable to dissuade Sadat from going to war and that, indeed, their manipu-
lations had actually led to an open rift with Egypt, which was manifested in 
the ouster of Soviet military personnel from Egypt, the Soviets almost 
ceased their attempts at influence. Though the procedures were not always 
to Egypt's satisfaction, the Soviet Union resumed arms transfers to Egypt. 
Soviet-Syrian Military Relations and 
the Syrian Invasion of Lebanon 
The pattern of Soviet-Syrian military relations following the Syrian 
invasion of Lebanon (June 1976) resembles in its general features the 
Soviet-Egyptian relationship prior to the October 1973 War. As in the 
Egyptian case, here too the Soviets employed arms transfers as an instru-
ment of influence in an effort to dissuade their Arab clients from adopting 
an unfavorable course of action. The results were also similar. Not only did 
the Soviets fail to influence their local clients, but their attempt at influence 
deteriorated into antagonism, compelling the Soviet Union to cease its 
manipulations and, unwillingly, accept its client's policy. 
During 1975 and the first months of 1976, the Lebanese crisis pro-
duced few if any indications of a possible Syrian-Soviet rift. On the 
contrary, the initial Soviet reaction towards Syrian involvement in 
Lebanon was essentially positive. For example, the Soviet communica-
tions media responded very favorably to Syria's "constructive role" in the 
achievement of the January 22, 1976 cease fire. According to the Soviet 
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argument, the cease fire undermined Israel's "plans to create another focus 
of tension in the Middle East."17 Although the Soviets were not overly 
pleased with Syria's growing indirect military involvement in Lebanon 
(through the Syrian-sponsored Sa'iqa) after early 1976, they tried to allow 
their resentment the lowest possible profile, and to avoid criticizing Syria 
publicly over its role in the Lebanese crisis. Instead, Soviet public criticism 
of the foreign intervention in Lebanon focused upon the "imperialist 
circles," including Israel and, occasionally, even Egypt, while Syria was 
mentioned either positively or not at all. 
By mid-1976 this Soviet attitude began to change. The severity of the 
Syrian-PLO armed confrontation, and the subsequent deepening rift 
within the leftist camp, placed the Soviet Union in an awkward position, 
and rendered almost inevitable a confrontation with one of its closest allies 
in the Middle East. The decision to risk a crisis with Syria over Lebanon 
cannot have been an easy one for the Soviet leadership, especially after its 
loss of access to Egypt and Anwar Sadat's unilateral abrogation of the two 
countries' friendship and cooperation treaty in March 1976. Nevertheless, 
the risk was taken. From May 1976, Soviet dissatisfaction with the grow-
ing Syrian intervention in Lebanon became increasingly apparent. It 
found prominent manifestation in the joint Soviet-Iraqi communiqué of 
May 31, published at the conclusion of Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to 
Baghdad. That communiqué stated that "a positive solution to the Leba-
nese crisis can beachieved by the Lebanese people themselves."18 President 
Asad, however, did not appear overly bothered by Soviet reservations 
regarding his Lebanese policy, and when Premier Kosygin arrived in 
Damascus on June 1, Asad presented him with a fait accompli. On the 
night of May 31-June 1, the Syrian regular army had rolled into Lebanon, 
and Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis had escalated to a higher 
level both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Direct Syrian military intervention in Lebanon brought Syrian-
Soviet relations to the verge of an open rift. Political tension found 
expression in increasingly severe criticism of Syria by the Soviet communi-
cations media during late 1976.19 At the same time, western press reports 
indicated a considerable slowdown in arms shipments from the Soviet 
Union to Syria. It is difficult to ascertain the scope of this arms supply 
cutback or of the items included. That it was perceived by the Syrians as 
very harmful became clear in their fierce reaction; they threatened to 
cancel the limited port services which the Soviets had enjoyed at Tartus 
since early 1976.20 Like the Egyptian episode four years earlier, this abrupt 
Syrian response apparently led Moscow to reconsider its policy. By early 
1977 all was back to normal, arms shipments were fully restored, and port 
services returned to the previous status quo.21 
Soviet-Iraqi Relations Following the 
Invasion of Iran (September 1980) 
During the 1970s, especially in the second half of the decade, follow-
ing the Egyptian desertion to the Western sphere of influence, Iraq became 
one of the leading Soviet arms clients in the Middle East. Between 1975 
and 1979, Iraqi arms purchases from the Soviet Union amounted to some 
$4.9 billion, as compared with "only" $3.6 billion for Syria. Against this 
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background Iraq might have expected Soviet understanding, or even tacit 
support, for its invasion of Iran, an invasion which Iraq portrayed in terms 
of a pre-emptive strike. 
Instead, the USSR announced its neutrality vis-à-vis the warring 
parties and called upon them to cease fighting and resolve the conflict by 
peaceful means. This Soviet interest in a peaceful solution to the Iraqi-
Iranian conflict was apparently sincere. The Soviet attitude towards the 
war, as expressed in the communications media, clearly reflected a sense 
that it contradicted both Soviet and local interests.22 
Several reasons underlay this negative Soviet reaction. First, the 
Soviet Union might have been apprehensive lest the Iraqis appeal for 
military assistance, or even intervention on the basis of the two countries' 
bilateral treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation signed in 1972, in 
case their operational plans went awry. Certainly the Soviets would prefer 
to avoid such an intervention. Second, there is little doubt that the Soviets 
perceived the war as serving American interests by creating a convenient 
way for the United States to return "through the back door" to Iran, where 
it had lost its pre-eminent status after the ouster of the Shah in February 
1979.23 Whatever the Soviet reasons for objecting to the war, the relevant 
point for this discussion is that their adoption of neutral posture was 
followed by the imposition of an arms embargo on Iraq. As in the Egyptian 
and Syrian cases, it is difficult to discern the exact pattern of the embargo, 
and there are a number of conflicting and contradictory reports regarding 
the issue. 
On the one hand, various sources (especially Western diplomatic and 
intelligence agencies) claim that the Soviet supply of arms to Iraq con-
tinued even after the outbreak of war, albeit discreetly and in an indirect 
manner. Soviet arms are said to have arrived in Iraq either by sea, to the 
Jordanian port of Aqaba, or by sea and air to Saudi Arabia and thence 
overland.24 On the other hand, the Soviet media repeatedly denied such 
reports, clearly and explicitly emphasizing the Soviet Union's neutral 
position in the dispute.25 Jordan and Saudi Arabia also denied that Soviet 
arms were passing through their respective countries en route to Iraq26 and 
even Iraq rejected the claim that Soviet arms were continuing to arrive.27 
Thus, there is room for scepticism regarding claims that the Soviet 
Union continued to supply weapons to Iraq even after the outbreak of war. 
It appears that a Soviet embargo on arms shipments to Iraq was imposed 
for about half a year, until April 1981, although its precise scope and terms 
are unclear. Nevertheless, certain Soviet-made items may well have 
reached Iraq indirectly, for instance, through Warsaw Pact countries. 
This assessment is based upon several observations. First of all, a 
retrospective view of the first half year after the outbreak of war,28 irrespec-
tive of concrete reports regarding supply or non-supply of arms, indicates 
that the Iraqi military buildup, which had been maintained in full force for 
the three years preceding the war and especially during that immediately 
preceding the conflict, had now come to a halt. Second, reports of con-
tinued Soviet arms and military equipment supply to Iraq were diffused by 
Western diplomatic and intelligence sources that obviously were interested 
in preventing the Soviets from deriving any possible benefit from the 
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conflict. Dissemination of reports on Soviet military aid to Iraq in its war 
against Iran well suited this scenario, as it could render Soviet-Iranian 
rapprochement most difficult. Third, the Soviets, like the Iraqis, Jordan-
ians and Saudis, repeatedly and unambiguously denied the reports on 
supply of Soviet arms to Iraq. Although such denials, at least that of Saudi 
Arabia, may have been motivated by a desire to avoid worsening relations 
with Iran or its supporters Syria and Libya, this does not explain why Iraq 
itself so firmly denied that it was receiving Soviet arms. During this time, 
Iraq clearly held the advantage in the war. Hence there was no obvious 
reason why Iraq or even Jordan would adopt an apologetic line with 
regard to Iran. 
Even the consistent and firm Soviet denial should not be attributed to 
a desire to avoid worsening relations alone. In the past, the Soviet Union 
had always avoided publicly admitting that it imposed military sanctions 
upon its clients, even in cases in which such sanctions undoubtedly were 
adopted.29 It is therefore difficult to comprehend why the Soviet Union 
would publicly acknowledge the imposition of political pressures upon its 
client were this not actually the case, and were there no clear benefits in 
store as a result of this measure.30 
It is thus arguable that a Soviet embargo was imposed upon Iraq in 
the wake of its invasion of Iran. In any event, it occurred during a relatively 
brief episode. By April 1981, it was an established fact that Soviet supply of 
major weapon systems in Iraq had been restored, in accordance with 
previously signed contracts. 
SUMMARY 
The main conclusion emerging from the three episodes dealt with in 
this article is that arms supply can, at times, hardly provide an effective 
basis for influence, especially when the attempts at influence touch upon 
local decisions regarding military operations or grand strategic policy 
questions of war and peace. If there is an inherent asymmetry in the 
arms-transfer relationship, it does not necessarily work to the advantage of 
the arms donor, as is commonly assumed, but rather to the benefit of the 
arms recipient. This somewhat paradoxical relationship may be formu-
lated as follows: there exists a negative correlation between the volume of 
arms transferred and the amount of influence derived by the arms donor. 
Put differently, the larger the arms transfers, the less political leverage the 
donor has obtained over the recipient. 
The rationale for this formula is quite simple. Having supplied a 
specific state with large quantities of arms and military equipment, the 
donor country — should it decide to employ the arms transfer relationship 
in order to prevent the local client from taking a major decision — finds 
itself in an all or nothing situation. The donor has to choose between 
employing its arms leverage vigorously and not employing it at all. There is 
no middle ground. Limited sanctions taken against a well-supplied client 
will most probably have a negligible effect upon his operative capability, 
due to the large quantities of arms he has at his disposal. On the other 
hand, the adoption of tough measures, such as a total arms embargo. 
against the local client might cause a confrontation, or even an open rift. 
Assuming that the large scale of military support rendered to that client 
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reflects the donor's vested interest in the recipient country, one easily 
perceives that a confrontation is the least desired development from the 
donor's point of view. It has been noted that the most unsuitable circum-
stances for the achievement of influence through arms are those involving 
decisions concerning war and peace. Since going to war is the ultimate 
foreign policy instrument at the disposal of any state, it is quite reasonable 
to assume that the adoption of such a policy indicates the prevailing 
importance of the interests that motivated the decision. If a state perceives 
certain interests as vital, it will be most unwilling to compromise them and 
will tend to reject any pressures designed to prevent it from carrying out its 
course of action. 
This, in fact, was the dilemma facing the Soviet Union in each of the 
three episodes analyzed. An extreme Soviet attitude toward manipulating 
the arms flows to its client states would most probably have caused a deep, 
possibly irreversible, rift, as indeed happened in the Egyptian and Syrian 
cases. Yet completely avoiding the use of an arms supply as an instrument 
of influence might have encouraged these states to proceed upon a course 
of action perceived by the Soviet Union as harmful to its own interests. The 
Soviets therefore chose the middle way and tried to manipulate the arms 
supplies to a degree they considered sufficient to influence their local 
clients, without antagonizing them. However, this Soviet assessment of the 
clients' "tolerance threshold" proved mistaken. Attempts at manipulation 
caused a fierce reaction on the clients' part and this in turn led the Soviet 
Union to abandon its attempts at influence and grudgingly to accept its 
clients' policy. The Soviets dared to pull the lever, but it broke off in their 
hands. 
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